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Abstract
We identify vulnerabilities in epidemic forwarding. We
address broadcast applications over wireless ad-hoc net-
works. Epidemic forwarding employs several mechanisms
such as inhibition and spread control, and each of them can
be implemented using alternative methods. Thus, the exis-
tence of vulnerabilities is highly dependent on the methods
used. We examine the links between them. We classify vul-
nerabilities into two categories: malicious and rational. We
examine the effect of the attacks according to the number of
attackers and the different network settings such as density,
mobility and congestion. We show that malicious attacks
are hard to achieve and their impacts are scenario depen-
dent. In contrast, rational attackers always obtain a signif-
icant benefit. The evaluation is carried out using detailed
realistic simulations over networks with up to 1000 nodes.
We consider static scenarios, as well as vehicular networks.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we identify vulnerabilities in epidemic for-
warding over ad-hoc networks. We are interested in broad-
cast applications such as chatting in a traffic jam or coupon
advertisements [5]. The principle of epidemic forwarding
is that nodes repeat with some probability the information
they hear from others, thus propagating fresh information.
Epidemic forwarding employs several mechanisms such
as inhibition, which prevents a node from forwarding over-
sent or over-received packets in order to minimize redun-
dancy. Each mechanism can be implemented using differ-
ent alternative methods. Thus, the existence of vulnerabil-
ities is highly dependent on the mechanisms employed and
on the methods adopted to achieve them. We examine the
links between these methods and the vulnerabilities.
We classify the vulnerabilities into two categories: mali-
cious and rational. A malicious attacker harms other nodes
and does not look for personal benefit. It aims at decreasing
other nodes’ throughput and/or spread. In contrast, a ratio-
nal attacker aims at increasing its personal profit from the
network. It tries to increase its throughput or save power.
We evaluate the vulnerabilities by simulations. We show
that a malicious attacker does not have much effect in highly
mobile networks, but it might be very harmful in static net-
works. In contrast, independently of mobility, the ratio-
nal attacker increases dramatically its throughput. Attacks
that are otherwise very harmful lose their efficiency in the
presence of some epidemic forwarding mechanisms such as
adaptive spread control and adaptive inhibition. Moreover,
many elements such as the attacker position and the node
density influence the malicious attacker’s impact.
The simulations are carried out on networks with up
to 1000 nodes using a JAVA implementation of the epi-
demic forwarding system in JIST-SWANS [1]. Beside static
scenarios, we applied the epidemic forwarding system to
the vehicular network using an extension of JIST-SWANS
called STRAW [2], which provides a mobility model based
on the operation of real vehicular traffic.
2. Epidemic Forwarding Mechanisms
In this section, we explain the different mechanisms used
in epidemic forwarding, in order to understand their vulner-
abilities.
2.1. Inhibition Mechanisms
Inhibition mechanisms aim at preventing nodes from for-
warding over-sent or over-received packets in order to min-
imize redundancy. We classify them into two sets: rigid
and adaptive. With the former set, the mechanisms can-
not adapt themselves to different network settings: when
the settings change, their parameters need to change. The
adaptive mechanisms ensure a good performance in a wide
range of settings without changing their parameters.
2.1.1. Rigid Inhibition. Within this set we find Gossip-
based epidemic forwarding [7] where a node decides to for-
ward a packet with a fixed probability p and drop it with
(1 − p). The value of p depends on the setting but Gossip
does not involve any mechanism to adapt p.
2.1.2. Adaptive Inhibition. Within this set we distin-
guish between two methods.
2.1.2.a. Counter Based Inhibition: This method is es-
sentially the one proposed in [8]. A packet stored in the
epidemic buffer has a counter called “Receive Count” in-
cremented by 1 when a duplicate of this packet is received.
Initially, i.e. when the packet is created by the application or
received for the first time, the counter is set to 0. When the
counter reaches a maximum value, the packet is discarded
from the epidemic buffer. When a packet is transmitted, the
value of Receive Count is lost.
2.1.2.b. Virtual Rate Based Inhibition: This method is
proposed in [4]. With this method, a packet in the epidemic
buffer is retransmitted with a probability that depends on
its “virtual rate”; it is equal to c0aRbS where c0 is a con-
stant (inverse of a time), R [resp. S] is the number of
times this packet or a duplicate was received [resp. sent]
and a and b are unit-less constants less than 1. Thus the
virtual rate of a packet decreases exponentially with any
send/receive event of the same packet. A scheduler decides
which packet is selected next for transmission by the MAC
layer; it serves packets with a rates not exceeding their vir-
tual rates. Hence, a packet in the epidemic buffer, which
has seen many send/receive events, is scheduled at a very
low rate and it is more likely that it will be dropped by the
used buffer management mechanism before being transmit-
ted [4]. The constant c0 is equal to the nominal packet rate
of the MAC layer.
2.2. Spread Control Mechanisms
Spread control mechanisms are essential for epidemic
forwarding, as the broadcast capacity does not scale with
the population. Spread control can be implemented using
one of the following methods.
2.2.1. Classic TTL. This is the method that comes by
default with the Internet Protocol (IP). When a packet is
created by a source and placed into the epidemic buffer,
it receives a TTL value equal to some positive constant
“MaxTTL”. When the packet is accepted for transmission
by the MAC layer, the TTL field of the transmitted packet is
equal to the value of the TTL field in the packet in the epi-
demic buffer, minus 1. The TTL field in the packet stored
in the epidemic buffer is unchanged.
When a packet created by some other node is received for
the first time at this node, the packet is delivered to the ap-
plication, and the value of the TTL is screened. If it is equal
to 0, it cannot be retransmitted and the packet is discarded.
Else (TTL≥ 1), the packet is stored in the epidemic buffer,
with TTL equal to the value present in the received packet.
When and if the packet is later accepted for transmission
by the MAC layer, the transmitted TTL field is equal to the
stored TTL minus 1, and the stored TTL is unchanged.
2.2.2. Aging. This method is proposed in [4] in a differ-
ent but essentially equivalent form. We give here a presen-
tation that combines different options in one single frame-
work. The method uses the TTL field like Classic TTL, but
the TTL of a packet may be decremented while it is stored in
the epidemic buffer, depending on receive and send events.
Formally, every packet in the epidemic buffer has an “age”
field, which is a fixed decimal positive number less than
256. When a packet, created by some other node, is re-
ceived by this node for the first time, its age is set to the
complement to 255 of the received TTL: age= 255− TTL.
When a packet is transmitted, its stored age is incremented
by a fixed amount K0 and then its TTL is set to 255− age.
When a duplicate packet is received, the received TTL is
ignored but the stored age is incremented by K1: age =
age+K1. When any packet is received, the stored age of all
packets in the epidemic buffer is incremented by K2: age =
age+K2. The node drops packets with age larger than 255.
2.3. Scheduler
Epidemic forwarding needs a scheduler for buffer man-
agement. To our knowledge, the only scheduler that is ex-
plicitly detailed in the literature is in [4]. It is used with
the virtual-rate based inhibition (Sect. 2.1.2.b). It decides
which packet in the epidemic buffer is selected for trans-
mission, i.e. to be passed to the MAC layer. In order to
ensure some level of fairness, the scheduler serves packets
per source Id, using a processor sharing approach. More-
over, every packet should be served at a rate not exceeding
its virtual rate computed in Sect. 2.1.2.b.
2.4. Control of Injection Rate
The only explicitly defined method to achieve control of
injection rate is the one in [4]. It is used together with the
aforementioned scheduler. The packets generated by the ap-
plication at a given node are placed into the epidemic buffer,
where they compete with the other packets for transmission
(but with a larger virtual rate, having R = S = 0). The
application rate is controlled by a windowing system : The
number of outstanding packets the application is allowed
to have in the epidemic buffer at this node is limited to -at
most- 2 [4]; a packet is deleted from the epidemic buffer
when a duplicate is received, which serves as implicit ac-
knowledgment (Ack).
3. Attacks
In this section, we describe the vulnerabilities that are
specific to epidemic forwarding. We distinguish between
two types of attackers: malicious and rational. The former
does not look for a personal benefit but aims to harm other
nodes. In contrast, the latter seeks to increase its personal
profit from the network. Most of the attacks are described
by drawing (Figs. 1 and 2) using a generic example where
the attacker is M and the victim in malicious case is A.
3.1. Malicious Attacks
A malicious attacker aims at decreasing the spread
and/or the injection rate of the victim by exploiting vulnera-
bilities in epidemic forwarding mechanisms. In the follow-
ing we identify five attacks and map them to their corre-
sponding epidemic forwarding mechanisms.
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M is the malicious node and A is the victim. We refer by Self to
packets generated at the node transmitting them, by Fwd to packets
forwarded by the node but generated by others and by Fake to
packets that are generated by M but carrying the victim identity (Id
= A). We will explain only the ”Inhibit by forwarding and TTL”
attack, as other attacks have similar explanation. In ”Inhibit by
Forwarding and TTL”, A sends a Self packet i with TTL = MaxTTL
−1, that is received by M and B. M forwards the packet i (Fwd: i)
3 times with TTL = 0, the packet (Fwd: i) is received by B and C.
Thus, the inhibition mechanism at B will inhibit packet i, as it is
received 4 times, and C will drop the packet, as its TTL = 0.
Figure 1. Malicious attacks.
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Figure 2. Sybil attack: M is the rational node.
3.1.1. Artificial High Density (AHD). In this attack, we
exploit the adaptability of the spread control to the conges-
tion and node density. The attacker places itself close to the
victim. It acts like any node: it has its self packets (pack-
ets that are generated at this node) to send and relays others
packets. But it does not forward victim packets. By gener-
ating much traffic in the very close surrounding of the vic-
tim, the attacker incites the spread-control mechanism at the
victim’s good neighbors to react negatively and prevent the
victim packets from going farther.
3.1.2. Inhibit by Forwarding (IbF) Attack. With IbF
(Fig. 1), the attacker exploits the adaptive inhibition.
It immediatly forwards the victim packets a number of
times (this number is called Attack-Persistency) to in-
hibit its neighbrhood from forwarding the same packets
(see Sect. 2.1.2). With the counter based inhibition (see
Sect. 2.1.2.a), the Attack-Persistency is equal to the max-
imum value the counter can reach. With the virtual rate
based inhibition, this Attack-Persistency should be large
enough to make the corresponding virtual rate close to zero
(in practice two times are enough).
3.1.3. Inhibit by TTL (IbTTL) Attack. This attack ex-
ploits the spread control using TTL. As the attacker receives
a victim packet, it forwards it immediatly with a TTL =
0. In Fig. 1, B and M receives a packet from A with TTL
= MaxTTL −1. M forwards it with TTL = 0 instead of
(MaxTTL −2). Hence, the attacker decreases the chance
the packet has to travel beyond C as B is inhibited and C
drops the packet. Even if B succeeds in forwarding the
packet after M, this will change nothing with C. This ex-
ample considers the use of “classic TTL” (see Sect. 2.2.1).
With “aging”, the attack is exactly the same. Note that in
Fig. 1, B applies the first strategy (see Sect. 2.2.1) upon re-
ceiving a duplicate of the packet and thus it keeps the old
TTL.
3.1.4. Inhibit by Forwarding and TTL (IbFTTL) At-
tack. This is a combination of IbF and IbTTL (Fig. 1). In
this case M forwards the victim packets Attack-Persistency
times with TTL = 0 to insure that the victim packets at B
are well inhibited and thus the packet loses any chance of
travelling beyond C.
3.1.5. Send on Behalf of the Victim (SoB) Attack. The
attacker exploits the scheduler and the aging mechanism. In
Fig. 1, M sends fake packets with A’s Id. As the scheduler
serves packets per source Id, A’s packets are delayed in the
epidemic buffer and they will be dropped either by the aging
mechanism (they become too old) or by buffer overflow.
3.2. Rational Attakcs
A rational attacker tries to increase its injection rate
while maintaining large spread. In the following, we iden-
tify two rational attacks.
3.2.1. Do Not Cooperate (DNC) Attack. When a new
packet is injected by the application at a given node, it is
placed in the epidemic buffer, where it competes with pack-
ets received from other nodes. This competition prevents
the application from injecting at the full rate allowed by
the packet injection control mechanism because of the ad-
ditional delay in the epidemic buffer. Thus, an attacker
decides to not cooperate and to keep only its self packets
(packets that are generated at this node) in the epidemic
buffer. Note that, if the attacker tries to go beyond the al-
lowed rate, its packets will be accumulated in other nodes,
which are not able to serve them at the same rate. Thus, it
risks killing its packets for the same reason as in Sect. 3.1.5.
3.2.2. Sybil Attack. We refer to the Sybil attacker as
the node that forges multiple identities [3]. This is a well-
known attack in networking, but the way it is exploited in
this paper is new and very specific to epidemic forward-
ing. As the scheduler serves packets per source Id, the at-
tacker sends its self packets with different Ids and thus it
increases their share of the bandwidth. In Fig. 2, we present
the scheduler as a process sharing approach where queues
are per source Id. In this case, M’s packets receive larger
bandwidth share than A’s packet at B.
4. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the impact of the aforemen-
tioned attacks by simulation. We apply them in static sce-
narios, as well as in highly mobile networks. We consider
vehicular mobility on the highway. Our metrics are based
on the spread and the injection rate: a malicious attacker
aims at reducing the victim spread and a rational one tries
to increase its rate while maintaining large spread.
In our simulation we consider the epidemic forwarding
system proposed in [4], called SLEF. To our knowledge,
SLEF is the only complete system proposed for a wide
range of settings. Furthermore, SLEF implements all epi-
demic forwarding mechanisms already discussed in Sect. 2:
The virtual rate based inhibition, spread control by TTL and
aging, injection rate control and the scheduler discussed in
Sect. 2.3. The parameter values of the virtual rate based in-
hibition are a = b = 0.15, c0 corresponds to 802.11b basic
rate (1Mbps) with a packet length of 1500 bytes. As for the
aging, we use K0 = K1 = 25 and K2 = 0.5.
4.1. Settings
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The victim is in the middle, the attackers start filling the positions
around the victim according to their index in an increasing order:
if one attacker, it fills position 1. If 2 attackers, they fill positions 1
and 2, and so on. R can be either 25m or 100m. d = 25m.
Figure 3. Malicious attackers positions.
With the static scenarios, we simulate from 200 up to 600
nodes uniformly distributed over a square of 500x500 m2,
but, in most cases, we show the results only for 400 nodes
as the others are similar. The transmission range is around
50 m (PDA transmission range).
In the case of a malicious attack, the victim is in the mid-
dle of the square and attackers take place around it as it is
indicated in Fig. 3. We want to evaluate the impact of the
distance between attackers and the victim. Therefore, the
radius R in Fig. 3 can have one of two values: 25m and
100m. With the former, the attackers of the corresponding
circle are within the transmission range of the victim and
they are outside it with the latter.
In the case of a rational attack, there exists only one at-
tacker, which is in the middle.
The network can be either congested, where all nodes are
sources sending at full rate (capacity allowed by the chan-
nel) or non-congested, where the victim is the only source
in the network and it is sending at full rate. Beside the vic-
tim, only attackers can act as sources in the non-congested
scenario, based on the attack they want to achieve.
In the following we will use the following notations:
“close” [resp. “far”] to indicate that R is equal to 25m [resp.
100m] and “one” [resp. “all”] to indicate that the network
is non-congested [resp. congested].
As for the mobile scenario, we simulate 1000 vehicles in
an urban two-lane road. The speed limit is 80 km/h. The car
density is 12.5 cars/km in each direction. The transmission
range is 300m, which is typical for vehicular network.
Our simulations are carried out through JIST-SWANS
[1], an open source simulator for ad hoc networks. The
MAC layer is a very accurate implementation of 802.11b
in DCF mode with the basic rate of 1 Mbps as we trans-
mit in broadcast (pseudo-broadcast [4]). As for the radio,
we use the capture effect to approach the real WIFI cards
that all implement it [6]. We consider fading channels with
free space path-loss. As for the mobile network, we use an
extension of JIST-SWANS called STRAW [2], which sim-
ulates the vehicular traffic and provides a mobility model
based on the operation of real vehicular traffic.
4.2. Static Scenarios
4.2.1. Malicious Attacks.
4.2.1.a. AHD: The results are shown in Fig. 4. Let us be-
gin with the “all” scenario (see Sect. 4.1) where the attack-
ers are sources and act as any other node, except that they
do not forward victim packets. In the “close” case, the im-
pact of the attack is considerable in both scenarios, “all” and
“one”, and it increases with the number of attackers. In con-
trast, in the “far” + “all” scenario, the attackers do not have
a major impact; the reason is twofold: (1) the attackers are
far from the victim and thus they do not increase the density
as much as in the “close” scenario; (2) the inhibition mech-
anism is adapted. Indeed, the attackers are numerous and
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Figure 4. Malicious attacks in static scenario.
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Figure 5. Rate of a victim facing SoB attack.
they cooperate in forwarding all packets except the victims,
hence they inhibit their neighbors from forwarding packets
except those of the victim. Thus, the increase in the victim
spread, which we notice for 8 attackers, is due to the fact
that victim packets are less inhibited than others. If the in-
hibition were rigid, we expect that AHD would have more
impact on the victim. In the “far” + “one” scenario, attack-
ers are still injecting new packets in the network as before.
They reduce considerably the victim spread.
4.2.1.b. IbF: The attackers do not generate fresh pack-
ets: their role is merely to forward victim packets as it is
explained in Sect. 3.1.2. The results are shown in Fig. 4. It
is clear that IbF does not achieve its goal. This can be ex-
plained as follows: When an attacker receives a new victim
packet, it immediately forwards it Attack-Persistency times
(if the MAC layer allows). If the same attacker receives
another victim packet, before it finishes forwarding the pre-
vious packet, it cancels the previous and it starts anew with
the newest. Thus, let us consider a scenario that happens
frequently. The victim sends a new packet. The attacker
forwards it immediately. The victim receives a duplicate of
its self packet and considers it as an implicit Ack. Hence,
it injects a new self packet that will be received by the at-
tacker before finishing the forwarding process and it will be
received by other attackers even before beginning the for-
warding process. Thus, all attackers cancel the previous
packet, which explains why it is not inhibited.
4.2.1.c. IbTTL: Our implementation of IbTTL is similar
to the one of IbF with the difference that it modifies the TTL
before forwarding, as it is explained in Sect. 3.1.3. This at-
tack is more harmful than IbF. The attacker needs to for-
ward the packet only once with TTL = 0. Thus, nodes that
receive the packet from the attacker for the first time are not
able to forward it due to its TTL. This makes the difference
with IbF, which needs to forward several times to inhibit the
packet in its neighborhood.
4.2.1.d. IbFTTL: This attack has approximately the same
impact as IbTTL, which is to be expected as IbF has little
effect on the victim.
4.2.1.e. SoB: The attackers send only fake packets at full
rate. Fig. 4 shows a significant decrease in spread and rate.
The spread reduction is due to the fact that victim packets
are killed in the epidemic buffers before being forwarded,
which is due to the delay caused by the fake packets (for
more explanation see Sect. 3.1.5). Moreover, the decrease
in rate is due to the delay of the implicit Ack that controls
the injection rate as explained in Sect. 2.4.
From what we have seen in this section, we can conclude
that the attackers are not able to harm the victim in the pres-
ence of mobility for two reasons. The first is that the impact
of the attackers is very position-dependent. The second is
that, even with the most harmful attack, the attackers could
reduce the spread of the victim, but its packets still reach a
few tens of nodes. If these nodes are mobile, they will carry
the victim packets beyond the barrier imposed by the at-
tacker. This conclusion is well verified later in the vehicular
network scenario.
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Figure 6. Rational attacks in static scenario.
4.2.2. Rational Attacks.
4.2.2.a. DNC: We evaluate the impact of DNC only in
the “all” scenario, where increasing the injection rate is a
challenge. In the “one” scenario, the attacker is the only
source in the network and he has the entire network ca-
pacity, thus it is meaningless to evaluate its impact in this
case. In Fig. 6, the performance of a DNC attacker is com-
pared with a well-behaved node that is very close to it and
thus they both experience the same network conditions. We
show the spread of both nodes and the rate ratio (DNC over
well-behaved). The DNC rate is four times larger than a
well-behaved node. But, surprisingly, the DNC spread is
much larger when the network is very dense (600 nodes).
The reason is as follows: The attacker does not forward
others’ packets. Thus, when it receives others’ packets, it
drops them without updating the age of its self packets in
the epidemic buffer. Hence, the age of its self packets does
not increase during their stay in its epidemic buffer by K2
(see Sect. 2.2.2), which allows them to travel farther.
4.2.2.b. Sybil: We evaluate the impact of Sybil in only
“all” scenario for the same reason as with DNC. The at-
tacker uses five different identities. In addition, it does not
forward others’ packets. So, our implementation is in fact
a combination of both attacks, Sybil and DNC, explained
in Sect. 3. This implementation gives the attacker a much
larger advantage than using DNC alone (up to 10 times
larger than a well-behaved node and 2.5 larger than the
DNC attacker), which explains the impact of Sybil alone.
4.3. Vehicular Network Scenario
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Figure 7. Vehicular Network. Malicious (a)
and Rational (b) attacks, “all” scenario.
In this scenario, nodes are highly mobile and the position
of the victim is not known. Thus, the attackers are chosen
randomly. Beside the attackers, the network contains 1000
well-behaved nodes, all of them are sources (“all” scenario).
All nodes cross the same urban road.
4.3.1. Malicious Attacks. Fig. 7(a) shows the impact of
malicious attacks. The spread of the victim is drawn ac-
cording to number of attackers. The Attack-Persistency of
IbF and IbFTTL is 2. Other values give the same results.
As we notice, the effect of the attackers is negligible even
in the presence of 100 attackers. In the most harmful case,
the IbFTTL attacker reduces the victim spread from 50 to
30 nodes, which is not significant. This can be explained
by the presence of the spread control mechanism; the at-
tacker can affect the victim only if their spreads interfere,
i.e. there exist common nodes that receive the attacker and
the victim packets. And the amount of harm is proportional
to the amount of interference. As the spread is limited by
the spread control mechanism, this interference is not con-
siderable and does not happen frequently.
4.3.2. Rational Attacks. Contrary to malicious attacks,
rational attacks are still powerful even in highly mobile net-
work. The results are shown in Fig. 7(b). Sybil still ensures
higher gain than DNC.
5. Conclusions
We identify vulnerabilities that are specific to epidemic
forwarding over wireless ad-hoc networks. We classify
these vulnerabilities into two categories: malicious and ra-
tional. We evaluate their impact according to the number
of attackers and the different network settings. We find that
the impact of malicious attacks depends on the position of
the attacker relative to the victim, the network density, the
traffic load and mobility. In static scenarios, we identify the
attacks that reduce dramatically the victim spread, whereas
the harm of other attacks is reduced due to the adaptive inhi-
bition and the injection rate control. In highly mobile vehic-
ular network, the impact of malicious attacks are minimized
due to the spread control.
We have studied the rational case in presence of only one
attacker in the network. The attacker could achieve consid-
erable profit in all scenarios.
Our work can be extended in different directions. We
plan to examine the impact of the presence of several ratio-
nal attackers on the network. Another extension is to find
solutions to recover from these vulnerabilities.
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